|
|
|
|
|
VI. INVESTMENT BANK ABUSES:
CASE STUDY OF GOLDMAN SACHS AND DEUTSCHE BANKC. Failing to Manage Conflicts of Interest: Case Study of Goldman Sachs
(1) Subcommittee Investigation and Findings of Fact
During the course of its investigation into the Goldman Sachs case study, the Subcommittee issued 13 document subpoenas as well as multiple document request letters to financial institutions, government agencies, hedge funds, due diligence firms, insurance companies, individuals, and others. The Subcommittee obtained tens of millions of pages of documents, including internal reports, memoranda, correspondence, spreadsheets, and email. The Subcommittee conducted over 55 interviews and one deposition, including interviews with a variety of senior executives and Mortgage Department personnel at Goldman Sachs. The Subcommittee also spoke with agency officials, law enforcement, and industry and academic experts in financial products and securities law. On April 27, 2010, the Subcommittee held a hearing which took testimony from Goldman senior executives and current and former employees of its Mortgage Department, and released 173 hearing exhibits. |1511| After that hearing, the Subcommittee gathered additional information in post-hearing interviews and through posthearing questions for the record. |1512|
In connection with the hearing, the Subcommittee released a joint memorandum from Chairman Levin and Ranking Member Coburn summarizing the investigation to date into the role of the investment banks in the financial crisis. The memorandum contained the following findings of fact, which this Report reaffirms, regarding the Goldman Sachs case study.
1. Securitizing High Risk Mortgages. From 2004 to 2007, in exchange for lucrative fees, Goldman Sachs helped lenders like Long Beach, Fremont, and New Century, securitize high risk, poor quality loans, obtain favorable credit ratings for the resulting residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), and sell the RMBS securities to investors, pushing billions of dollars of risky mortgages into the financial system.
2. Magnifying Risk. Goldman Sachs magnified the impact of toxic mortgages on financial markets by re-securitizing RMBS securities in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), referencing them in synthetic CDOs, selling the CDO securities to investors, and using credit default swaps and index trading to profit from the failure of the same RMBS and CDO securities it sold.
3. Shorting the Mortgage Market. As high risk mortgage delinquencies increased, and RMBS and CDO securities began to lose value, Goldman Sachs took a net short position on the mortgage market, remaining net short throughout 2007, and cashed in very large short positions, generating billions of dollars in gain.
4. Conflict Between Client Interests and Proprietary Trading. In 2007, Goldman Sachs went beyond its role as market maker for clients seeking to buy or sell mortgage related securities, traded billions of dollars in mortgage related assets for the benefit of the firm without disclosing its proprietary positions to clients, and instructed its sales force to sell mortgage related assets, including high risk RMBS and CDO securities that Goldman Sachs wanted to get off its books, and utilizing key roles in CDO transactions to promote its own interests at the expense of investors, creating a conflict between the firm's proprietary interests and the interests of its clients.
5. Abacus Transaction. Goldman Sachs structured, underwrote, and sold a synthetic CDO called Abacus 2007-AC1, did not disclose to the Moody's analyst overseeing the rating of the CDO that a hedge fund client taking a short position in the CDO had helped to select the referenced assets, and also did not disclose that fact to other investors.
6. Using Naked Credit Default Swaps. Goldman Sachs used credit default swaps (CDS) on assets it did not own to bet against the mortgage market through single name and index CDS transactions, generating substantial revenues in the process.
Notes
1511. "Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role o 1511 f Investment Banks," before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, S.Hrg. 111-674 (4/27/2010) (hereinafter "April 27, 2010 Subcommittee Hearing"). [Back]
1512. See, e.g., Responses to Questions for the Record from Goldman Sachs, including Lloyd C. Blankfein; David A. Viniar; Craig W. Broderick; Daniel L. Sparks; Michael J. Swenson; Joshua S. Birnbaum; and Fabrice P. Tourre, PSI_QFR_GS0001-548 [Redacted]. Unredacted version maintained in the files of the Subcommittee [Sealed Exhibit]. (Hereinafter referred to as "Response to Subcommittee QFR.") [Back]
Back to Contents C. Failing to Manage Conflicts of Interest: Case Study of Goldman Sachs (2) Goldman Sachs Background
This document has been published on 08Jul11 by the Equipo Nizkor and Derechos Human Rights. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.
